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Kent A. Wilson*
Vengeance and Mercy: Implications
of Psychoanalytic Theory for the
Retributive Theory of
Punishment
While it is perhaps a marriage damned, the union of law and
social science has spawned numerous offspring. Empirical find-
ings of fact from psychology, sociology, and psychiatry have served
increasingly as the ratio decidendi in legal decisions of staggering
import. The decisions to integrate public schools,' to restrict the
use of certain forms of punishment,2 and to revamp the classical
definition of criminal insanity,3 to mention but a few, have rested
squarely on evidence received from the ostensibly non-legal realm
of social science.
As the viability of using social science data to affect the legal
system increases, the range of legal issues in which social science
researchers are becoming involved is rapidly expanding. The at-
tention of the researcher is shifting to examine not only case-spe-
cific questions of empirical fact, but also to examine the
assumptions underlying both procedural and substantive matters
* Doctoral candidate in clinical psychology, Law-Psychology Graduate Train-
ing Program, University of Nebraska. A-A., 1970, BA., 1971, Metropolitan
State College; M.S., 1973, New Mexico Highlands University; J.D., 1980, Uni-
versity of Nebraska.
1. The "separate but equal" justification for segregated public schools was
struck down on the basis of empirical studies demonstrating that segregated
schools instill a sense of inferiority in black children, which subsequently af-
fects their motivation to learn. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 487
(1954).
2. Isolating a juvenile for two weeks at a training school was held to violate the
eighth amendment on the basis of testimony received from seven psychia-
trists, psychologists, and educators. Lollis v. New York Dep't of Social Servs.,
322 F. Supp. 473, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, 328 F. Supp. 1115 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
3. Although overruled by United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
the holding in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), demon-
strated the impact of social science testimony when it served as the initial
challenge to the M'Naghten test of criminal insanity, see M'Naghten's Case,
10 Cl. & F;200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
VENGEANCE AND MERCY
of law.4
This article extends the merger of law and social science to the
areas of retribution and criminal punishment. More specifically, it
examines the concept of retribution from historical, philosophical,
and psychological points of view.5 The goal is to develop an inte-
grated concept of retribution, and to discern variables that psycho-
logical theory and research indicate are relevant to legal theories
and practices in the area of retributive punishment.
I. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF RETRIBUTION
The "eye for an eye" notion of vengeance incorporated in the
principle of jus talionis has been a central feature of societal
thought for thousands of years. In primitive societies, crimes com-
mitted against an individual were avenged by either the victim or
his clan.6 Under this principle of the blood feud, members of a vic-
tim's clan were bound under a customary duty to exact from the
offender (or a member of the offender's clan) a punishment
equivalent to the injury suffered by the victim. Exactness in the
form and degree of retribution was demanded. An early English
case (circa 1115) relates: "a man who has killed another by falling
on him from out of a tree is himself put to death in exactly the
same method-a relation of the deceased solemnly mounting the
tree, and... descending on the offender. ' 7
The system of unrestricted blood feud eventually proved unsat-
isfactory.. The most serious drawback was that no acceptable
method was available to end the quarrel. An act of retaliation on
the part of one clan would be cause for an act of retaliation on the
part of the other clan. This was because no clan recognized that a
wrong committed against another clan was itself a wrong, or that
another clan had a right to avenge an injury. An initial injury,
therefore, began a perpetual vendetta.8
4. See generally L. FRIEDMAN & S. MACAULAY, LAw AND THE BEHAvIORAL Sci-
ENCES (1969); B. SALES, PSYCHOLOGY IN THE LEGAL PROCESS (1977).
5. Just as six blind men can approach an elephant and develop entirely different
concepts of what an elephant is (depending on what part of the elephant they
contact), confining an analysis of retribution solely to the legal or penological
viewpoint precludes other potentially valid (although also potentially re-
stricted) perspectives. Retribution exists not only as a legal or penological
concept, but also as a historical practice, a philosophical concept, and a psy-
chological phenomenon. Through examining and integrating these various
perspectives, one can more readily assess the strengths and weaknesses of
each, draw conclusions as to the nature of retribution, and evaluate the as-
sumptions underlying the legal perspective of retribution.
6. H. BARNES & N. TEETERS, NEw HoRIZoNS IN CRIMINOLOGY 399 (1943).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 401.
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The development of systems of compensation and composition
mitigated the self-perpetuating effects of the blood feud.9 Under
these systems, fines or monetary restitution could be sought in lieu
of blood revenge. Early codes of many peoples, particularly the
Anglo-Saxons, devoted much attention to a complicated system of
regulations dealing with the determination of the wergild: the
value of a man.10
Gradually the right of the victim to seek restitution or revenge
from the offender gave way to the increasing claim of the state to
the exclusive right to inflict retributory punishment." If a victim
was unable to demand the wergild due, or to pursue a proper
blood feud, he or she could apply to the local lord for assistance.
The offender soon had to pay additional sums of money, known as
manbot and wite, to the victim and the king or lord respectively.' 2
By the end of the twelfth century, however, the victim's right to
monetary damages had vanished. Crimes were viewed as wrongs
against the king's peace, not as wrongs against the victim, and all
fines went to the royal treasury rather than to the victim or the
victim's family.13
Similarly, during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the right
of the victim to seek blood revenge lost ground to the power of the
king.' 4 It persisted somewhat in the form of the duel, but restric-
tions on this form of retribution effectively curbed its use. Th
principle of vengeance was retained, but transformed from private
into public vengeance.' 5
Public vengeance generally took the form of corporal and capi-
tal punishment. Flogging, mutilation (ranging from amputation to
tongue boring), branding, the use of stocks and the pillory, and
chaining were common forms of corporal punishment.16 Methods
of capital punishment included flaying, impaling, beheading, hang-
ing, firing squad, electrocution, and lethal gas.17 Many of these
forms of corporal and capital punishment survived relatively intact
through the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Wolfgang, Victim Compensation in Crimes of Personal Violence, 50 MmNN. L
REv. 223, 223-25 (1965).
12. The manbot was paid as compensation for injuries less than death; the wite
was a fine payable to the king or lord; the wergild was monetary compensa-
tion paid to a family group if a member of that family was killed or injured. F.
WINEs, PUNIsmENT AND REFORMATION 37-38 (1895).
13. Smith, Mere People and Criminal Justice: A Proposalfor Personal Responsi-
bility, 51 CAL. ST. BAR J. 388, 391 (1976).
14. Id.
15. H. BA NEs & N. TEETERS, supra note 6, at 404.
16. Id. at 405-13.
17. Id. at 415-21.
[Vol. 60:276
VENGEANCE AND MERCY
During the mid-nineteenth century, however, consideration be-
gan to be given to the utility of punishment.18 The notion of using
punishment to rehabilitate and deter gained public support. Pun-
ishment began to be viewed not as a means of exacting retribution
in accordance with the degree of harm done, but as a means to
help the offender surmount the societal and personal obstacles
which had led him or her to a life of crime.' 9
The focus in the twentieth century continued to shift from retri-
bution and satisfaction of societal debt to treatment of individual
offenders in order to restore them to societal usefulness. Forms of
corporal punishment were struck down as violating the eighth
amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment;20 prison
sentences became indeterminate in order to assure that an of-
fender was not incarcerated longer than necessary for rehabilita-
tion.2 1 Prison came to be viewed as an institution designed to
provide rehabilitative experiences.22 Punishment for the sake of
exacting revenge or giving the offender his or her 'Just deserts"
was seen as non-productive and wasteful.23
Within the last fifteen to twenty years a resurgence of interest
in retributive forms of punishment has occurred. Proponents of
retribution argue persuasively that the goals of rehabilitation and
deterrence are not being achieved 24 and that indeterminate sen-
tencing, developed in the interests of rehabilitation, creates more
problems than it solves.2 5 "Dehabilitation" rather than rehabilita-
tion occurs, it is argued, when an offender is incarcerated for an
indefinite period.26
A recent call for a return to the retributive theory of punish-
ment is found in the recommendations of the Committee on the
Study of Incarceration.2 7 The Committee, established in response
to prison uprisings of the early 1970s, stunned the correctional and
18. See generally AMERIcAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITrEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE
(1971); N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); REPORT OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIIINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND
CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976); J. WSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975).
19. See generally authorities cited note 18 supra.
20. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968). See also Comment, The Role of
the Eighth Amendment in Prison Reform, 38 U. CH L REV. 647 (1971).
21. See Lay, A Judicial Mandate, 7 TRIAL 14, 15-18 (1971).
22. See generally authorities cited in note 18 supra.
23. See generally authorities cited note 18 supra.
24. See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITIEE, supra note 18; T. SEIUN,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 138 (1967); Chiricos & Waldo, Punishment and Crime:
An Examination of Some Empirical Evidence, 18 SoC. PROB. 200 (1970).
25. A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976).
26. Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (1974).
27. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 25, passim.
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judicial communities in 1976 when one of its members, Andrew von
Hirsch, published the Committee's recommendation to abandon
indeterminate sentencing schemes, based on rehabilitation and
deterrence, in favor of fixed sentencing, based primarily on retrib-
utive considerations. 28
Under this fixed sentencing scheme, an offender is sentenced so
that he or she receives the "just deserts" of his or her criminal
act.29 De-emphasizing rehabilitation, deterrence, and isolation, the
Committee proposed two criteria for sentences: the harm charac-
teristically associated with the offense, and the culpability of the
offender.30 Although a pure retributive model of punishment is di-
luted by allowing sentences to vary somewhat according to the in-
dividual offender's degree of culpability,3 1 the overriding notion of
equating punishment to the seriousness of the offense has brought
the Committee's model to the forefront of the current retributivist
resurgence.
H. THE PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATIONS OF
RETRIBUTIVE THEORY
For examining questions of punishment, H.L.A. Hart has ad-
vanced a two-stage analytical framework.32 At the most global
level, the overall rationale or justification for inflicting punishment
must be examined. Hart referred to this analysis as an investiga-
tion of the "General Aim" of punishment.3 3 With respect to retrib-
utive theories of punishment, Hart stated that the General Aim of
retribution is to return to the offender suffering for moral evil vol-
untarily done; he based this on the assumption that return of suf-
fering is just, or morally good.34
Hart's second level of analysis concerns what he termed "Ques-
tions of Distribution."3 5 Here attention is directed to the issues of
who is to be punished, how severely, and in what manner.3 6 To
these issues Hart answered: "[A] person may be punished if, and
only if, he has voluntarily done something morally wrong;... his
punishment must in some way match, or be the equivalent of, the
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 79-80.
31. Gardner, The Renaissance of Retribution-An Examination of Doing Justice,
1976 Wis. L REv. 781, 798-802.
32. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in H.L. HART, PUNISH-
iEAr N RESPONSmmTY 1 (1968).
33. Id. at 8-9.
34. Id. at 231.
35. Id. at 11-12.
36. Id.
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wickedness of his offense ....
Although Hart's view of the issues involved in the distribution
of retributive punishment (i.e., who and how to punish) is valid,
his justification (General Aim) of retribution is flawed. To justify
punishment on the grounds that punishment is "just" or "morally
good" is circular. In his examination of the differing theories of
punishment, Honderich has noted:
To attempt to argue that a man's punishment is justified, by saying in this
sense that he deserves it, is obviously pointless. Any desert claim that
reduces to the assertion that it is obligatory or permissible to impose a
penalty cannot, of course, be offered as a reason for the proposition in dis-
pute, that it is obligatory or permissible to impose the penalty. This is a
simple fallacy where the supposed reason is identical with the supposed
conclusion.3 8
Despite this error in his underlying logic, Hart's scheme of anal-
ysis has merit. Consequently, this discussion will adopt Hart's
framework for assessing the philosophical bases of retribution.
A. The General Aim or Justification of Retribution
The General Aim of retribution theory differs significantly from
other theories of punishment, in its "backward-looking" focus.
Other theories of punishment (e.g., rehabilitation, deterrence, and
isolation) punish offenders in pursuit of some future goal (i.e., se-
curing rehabilitation of the offender, deterring the offender and
others from committing future offenses, and separation of the of-
fender from society, respectively). In retribution, however, pun-
ishment is meted out solely because the offender has committed a
crime; punishment does not serve as the means to an end, but is
itself an end. Immanuel Kant, an oft-cited proponent of retribu-
tion, has stated:
Juridical Punishment can never be administered merely as a means for
promoting another Good either with regard to the Criminal himself or to
Civil Society, but must in all cases be imposed only because the individual
on whom it is inflicted has committed a Crime.... The Penal Law is a
Categorical Imperative; and woe to him who creeps through the serpent-
windings of Utilitarianism to discover some advantage that may discharge
him from the Justice of Punishment ... 39
Punishment is justified in retributive thought because the of-
fender, through committing a crime, has upset some form of socie-
tal balance. The offender has created an evil which must be
37. Id. at 231.
38. T. HoNDERicH, PuNIsHmENT:. THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS (1969).
39. L KANT, THE METAPHY'SIC OF MORALS, in THE PHoSOPHY OF LAw 195 (W.
Hastie trans. 1887), reprinted in 42 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WoRLm 395
(1952) (emphasis in original).
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requited4o or annulled,4 1 has obtained an advantage which other
members of society have been denied,42 has achieved a gain at the
expense of another,43 or has received a satisfaction at the expense
of others.44
Retributive theorists differ as to where, or between whom, the
imbalance develops following the commission of a crime. Aristotle
would place the imbalance as existing between the perpetrator of
the act (the criminal) and its recipient (the victim):
[T] he law looks only to the distinctive character of the injury, and treats
the parties as equal, if one is in the wrong and the other is being wronged,
and if one inflicted injury and the other has received it. Therefore, this
kind of injustice being an inequality, the judge tries to equalize it; for in
the case also in which one has received and the other has inflicted a
wound, or one has slain and the other been slain, the suffering and the
action have been unequally distributed; but the judge tries to equalize by
means of the penalty, taking away from the gain of the assailant.
4 5
Herbert Morris, on the other hand, deemed the imbalance to lie
not between the offender and the victim, but between the offender
and the whole of society.46 In Morris's view, society exists as a sys-
tem wherein individuals comply with rules (bear a burden) in or-
der to assure benefits for all. A crime occurs when an individual
renounces his or her burden and thereby gains an advantage
which the rule-abiding citizenry does not have. Meting out punish-
ment to an individual who gains such an unfair advantage serves
to "[assure] that [those who comply] will not be assuming bur-
dens which others are unprepared to assume... [and] prevent[s]
a maldistribution in the benefits and burdens." 47
The view taken by Georg W.F. Hegel differs markedly from that
of either Aristotle or Morris. Hegel viewed a criminal act not as
creating an imbalance between an offender and another party (or
parties), but as negating that which exists in universal conscious-
ness as right. Right, being absolute, cannot be negated; it is there-
fore obligatory that the nullity created by the crime be annulled.
Punishment annuls the negation of right. As Hegel stated, "The
criminal act is not a primary, positive thing to which the punish-
40. E. DuKHnEnm, THE DivISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 108 (1964) (original publica-
tion 1893).
41. G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT paras. 95-100 (1821), reprinted in 46 GREAT
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 9 (1952).
42. Morris, Persons and Punishment, in J. FEINBERG & H. GROSS, PHILOSOPHY OF
LAw 572, 573 (1975).
43. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, blk. V., ch. 4, at 1132, reprinted in 9 GREAT
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 333, 379 (1952).
44. T. HONDERICH, supra note 38, at 25.
45. ARISTOTLE, supra note 43, at 1132.
46. Morris, supra note 42, at 573.
47. Id.
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ment would be added as a negation, but a negative, so that punish-
ment is only a negation of negation."48
While Aristotle and Morris viewed punishment as a means of
taking from the offender that which he or she has criminally
gained, James F. Stephen 49 shifted the focus from the offender to
the victim and ascribed to punishment the ability to give "satisfac-
tions" to feelings of hatred possessed by the victim stemming from
the offender's act. Stephen stated:
It is not difficult to show that [crimes] have been forbidden and subjected
to punishment not only because they are dangerous to society, and so
ought to be prevented, but also for the sake of gratifying the feelings of
hatred-call it revenge, resentment, or what you will-which the contem-
plation of such conduct excites in healthy minds. If this can be shown, it
will follow that criminal law is in the nature of a persecution of the grosser
forms of vice, and an emphatic assertion of the principle that the feelings
of hatred and the desire for revenge above-mentioned are important ele-
ments of human nature which ought in such cases to be satisfied in a regu-
lar public and legal manner.50
The imbalance to be remedied under Stephen's analysis is not that
of the offender's gain, but that of the victim's emotional griev-
ance.51
Regardless of one's perspective of the exact nature of the imbal-
ance created by a criminal act, punishment is deemed capable of
restoring equilibrium in all cases. According to Kant:
Public Justice takes as its Principle and Standard ... the Principle of
Equality, by which the pointer of the Scale of Justice is made to incline no
more to the one side than to the other. It may be rendered by saying that
the undeserved evil which anyone commits on another is to be regarded
as perpetrated on himself.... This is the Right of Retaliation (jus ta-
lionis); and properly understood, it is the only Principle which in regulat-
ing a Public Court, as distinguished from mere private judgment, can
definitely assign both the quality and the quantity of a just penalty. All
other standards are wavering and uncertain; and on account of other con-
siderations involved in them, they contain no principle conformable to the
sentence of pure and strict Justice.5 2
It is the duty of the state rather than the individual victim to
seek retribution from the offender.53 The victim of a crime is felt to
be too subjectively and emotionally involved to exact a fitting pun-
ishment. Were the victim to exact punishment, such would be an
act of vengeance rather than an act of punishment. Vengeance is
itself seen as an evil, but the administration of punishment by an
48. G. HEGEL, supra note 41, para. 101. See also A. EwiNG, THE MORALrrY OF PUN-
isHmENT 21-26 (1929).
49. J. STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERN (1874).
50. Id. at 161-62.
51. See also A. EwiNG, supra note 48, at 65-73; T. HONDERICH, supra note 38, at 17-
21.
52. L KANT, supra note 39, at 196.
53. See generally G. HEGEL, supra note 41, para. 220.
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impartial tribunal is said to further reparation of the societal im-
balance:
When the right against crime has the form of revenge,... it is only right
implicit, not right in the form of right, i.e. no act of revenge is justified.
Instead of the injured party, the injured universal now comes on the
scene, and this has its proper actuality in the court of law. It takes over
the pursuit and the avenging of crime, and this pursuit consequently
ceases to be the subjective and contingent retribution of revenge and is
transformed into the genuine reconciliation of right with itself, i.e. into
punishment.5 4
B. Questions of Distribution in Retribution
Questions of distribution in retribution (who is to be punished,
how severely, and in what manner) are highly problematic. Be-
cause punishment is administered in order to restore some form of
societal balance, the amount of punishment to be inflicted gener-
ally is viewed as being mandatorily equivalent to the degree of in-
jury caused by the crime. This requirement of injury/punishment
equivalence is found in all traditional theories of retribution, even
though variations exist as to what constitutes the injury. Accord-
ingly, Aristotle would seek to equate the punishment with the
"gain" accrued by the offender; Morris would seek to remove the
"advantage" gained; Hegel would have the evil "annulled"; Kant
would require repayment of "like with like"; Stephen would seek
"satisfactions" sufficient to placate the victim's "grievance."5 5
Although balancing the punishment and the injury is concep-
tually simple, determining the specific nature of the punishment to
be inflicted presents a more difficult issue. Kant argues forcefully
for the principle of jus talionis, wherein the penalties are designed
to provide "like with like."56 Underjus talionis, one is to examine
the nature of the offense and then render a punishment designed
to bring upon the offender a loss of the same nature as that in-
flicted on the victim:
Thus a pecuniary penalty on account of a verbal injury, may have no di-
rect proportion to the injustice of slander; for one who is wealthy may be
able to indulge himself in this offence for his own gratification. Yet the
54. Id. (emphasis in original). This fear of subjective acts of vengeance is shared
by proponents of utilitarian theories of punishment:
I doubt not but it will be objected that it is unreasonable for men to
be judges in their own cases, that self-love will make men partial to
themselves and their friends; and, on the other side, ill-nature, pas-
sion, and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others, and
hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow ....
J. LOCKE, CONCERNING CIVIL GOVERNMENT, ch. II, para. 13 (1690), reprinted in
35 GREAT BooKs OF THE WEsTERN WORLD 25, 28 (1952).
55. See text accompanying notes 40-52 supra (a discussion of the theoretical dif-
ferences underlying the varying concepts of the nature of an injury).
56. L KANT, supra note 39, at 197.
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attack committed on the honour of the party aggrieved may have its
equivalent in the pain inflicted upon the pride of the aggressor, especially
if he is condemned by the judgement of the Court, not only to retract and
apologize, but to submit to some meaner ordeal, as kissing the hand of the
injured person. In like manner, if a man of the highest rank has violently
assaulted a person of the lower orders, he may be condemned not only to
apologize but to undergo a solitary and painful imprisonment, whereby, in
addition to the discomfort endured, the vanity of the offender would be
painfully affected, and the very shame of his position would constitute an
adequate Retaliation after the principle of "Like with Like.
' 5 7
Modern day retributivists, however, are unable to apply jus ta-
lionis strictly. The eye-for-an-eye concept clearly is not palatable
to the twentieth-century form of jurisprudence, which forbids
needless infliction of suffering and bars even the least painful
forms of corporal punishment.5 8 The deliberate infliction of
shame5 9 or banishment 60 or the seizure of an offender's property6l
(forms of lex talioniS62 ) are similarly forbidden.
Current forms of punishment are essentially limited to impris-
onment and fines. 63 Such a restriction on the available forms of
punishment has served, and continues to serve, as an obstacle to
the retributivist's goal of inflicting a punishment equivalent to the
criminal injury. Hegel reasoned that equality (between injury and
punishment) needs to exist only implicitly, or in "value," rather
than in identical form.6 4 The task, therefore, is to determine the
57. Id.
58. See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (barring use of the strap);
Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 1967) (relief granted against the
use of such devices as the crank telephone and the teeter board). The contin-
ued existence of capital punishment, however, may be seen as an exception
to the abolishment of the lex talionis.
59. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 272-73 (1972); Comment, supra
note 20, at 656-61.
60. Afroyirn v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
61. Cf. Bearden v. Industrial Comm'n, 14 Ariz. App. 336, 483 P.2d 568 (1971) (right
to workmen's compensation and accident benefits not suspended during im-
prisonment of claimant serving less than a life sentence, but confinement
does not extend time within which to measure and protect rights). See gener-
ally Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction,
23 VAND. L. REV. 929, 1079-1143 (1970) (overview of prisoner's loss of property
rights, insurance, pension, and workmen's compensation benefits).
62. The termjus talionis refers to the abstract principle of exacting revenge in a
"like for like" manner, while the term lex talionis is generally understood to
refer to more specific enactments of rules allowing punishment in the "like
for like" fashion. See generally BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 770, 822 (rev. 5th ed.
1979).
63. Statutory schemes of victim restitution in some jurisdictions extend the con-
cept of "punishment" to include repayment of the victim's actual damages by
the offender. See Schultz, The Violated: A Proposal to Compensate Victims of
Violent Crime, 10 ST. Louis UJ.LJ. 238 (1965); Wolfgang, supra note 11.
64. Hegel, stated:
It is only in respect of that form that there is a plain inequality be-
tween theft and robbery on the one hand, and fines, imprisonment,.
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length of imprisonment necessary to equate the punishment with
the injury suffered by the victim. Hegel felt the amount of punish-
ment (i.e., the length of the sentence) can be readily ascertained
through reference to "ideas universally present to conscious psy-
chological experience." 65 In practical terms, Hegel argued that
penalties should be based on public sentiments as to the appropri-
ate sentence length for the various criminal offenses. 66
Having discerned that punishment under a retributive philoso-
phy is to be meted out (distributed) to the offender in a quantity
and form designed to approximate the harm or injury caused by
the criminal act, the distributive question of who merits punish-
ment deserves attention. While philosophers basically agree that
punishment should extend only to those convicted of an offense,
conceptual difficulties have emerged in examining who or what
con~titutes an "offender." More precisely, the issue is whether
punishment should be extended to an individual solely in re-
sponse to his or her forbidden act, or whether punishment should
be contingent on the individual's having possessed intent to com-
mit the act. Particularly troublesome to some analysts of the re-
tributive view is the potential for punishing an individual
convicted of breaking a rule (law) accidentally, or through the doc-
trine of "vicarious liability."67 Professor Martin R. Gardner framed
the issue clearly:
If culpability is limited to intent to do the proscribed act, then it is difficult
to maintain that punishment is deserved under statutes requiring only
that the defendant violate some standard of care which a reasonable mem-
ber of the community would not have violated....
.... If culpability means the existence of an affirmative state of mind
with respect to the particular proscribed act or consequence, then punish-
ment could not be justified under statutes where a sufficient condition for
conviction is a finding that the proscribed act was committed. But if cul-
pability is thought of more broadly as requiring only some sort of causal
relationship between the accused and the act in question, then punish-
ment under traditional "strict liability" statutes may be justified. 6 8
etc., on the other. In respect of their "value," however, i.e. in respect
of their universal property of being injuries, they are comparable.
Thus, as was said above, it is a matter for the Understanding to look
for something approximately equal to their "value" in this sense.
G. HEGEL, supra note 41, para. 101.
65. Id.
66. Such surveys by social science researchers have found significant agreement
among demographic groups as to the length of prison terms which should be
given various offenders. Thomas, Cage & Foster, Public Opinion of Criminal
Law and Legal Sanctions: An Examination of Two Conceptual Models, 67 J.
Clum. L. & CRmNoLoGy 110 (1976).
67. See T. HONDERICH, supra note 38, at 2-3.
68. Gardner, supra note 31, at 793-94 (footnotes omitted).
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An examination of the historical and philosophical sources of
retributive theory, however, clearly discredits imposing retributive
punishment on an individual who did not rationally choose to com-
mit the forbidden act. Hegel observed:
The injury [the penalty] which falls on the criminal is not merely implic-
itly just-as just, it is eo ipso his implicit will, an embodiment of his free-
dom, his right; on the contrary, it is also a right established within the
criminal himself, i.e. in his objectively embodied will, in his action. The
reason for this is that his action is the action of a rational being ....
Further, what is involved in the action of the criminal is not only
the concept of crime, the rational aspect present in crime as such whether
the individual wills it or not, the aspect which the state has to vindicate,
but also the abstract rationality of the individual's volition. Since that is
so, punishment is regarded as the criminal's right and hence by being pun-
ished he is honoured as a rational being.6 9
I. PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVES OF VENGEANCE
AND MERCY
A person's car is stolen, his home is vandalized, his child is as-
saulted: how does he respond? The answer initially is quite sim-
ple: he becomes angry. His anger may emanate in many
directions. He may be angry at himself for leaving his keys in the
car, at his wife for failing to lock the door, or at his child for being
out alone. The bulk of the anger, however, will be directed toward
the perceived cause of the problem: the offender. Had these
events occurred in an earlier day, the course of action would be
clear. find the offender and avenge the wrong.70 Conditioned by
centuries of legal socialization, however, the modern victim will
call on outside agents (i.e., the police, courts, and correctional sys-
tem) to avenge the wrong.71
Defining a person's response to a wrongdoing in terms of anger
and a desire for vengeance, however, fails to address the more cen-
tral issue of why the individual becomes angry. In the examples
above no clear injury has befallen the victim. He lost a car, the
house was damaged, or the child was injured, but the victim has
not personally suffered a direct injury. Granted, the individual
may have suffered a monetary loss in the first two situations, but
such an explanation only begs the question of why or how a mone-
tary loss gives rise to anger.
The answer lies in the fact that the car, the house, and the child
are more than mere possessions of the individual; they are objects
of personal meaning and import. They are objects that the individ-
ual has ascribed meaning to, objects the individual has a personal
69. G. HEGEL, supra note 41, para. 100 (emphasis in original).
70. See text accompanying notes 6-8 supra.
71. Wolfgang, supra note 11, at 227-29.
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investment in, objects that indeed represent an extension of the
individual beyond his or her body into the surrounding world. The
objects are, in essence, a part of the individual, and to the extent
that they are damaged, he too is damaged.
A. Cathexes, Object Relationships, and the Development of Meaning
The process of investing oneself into objects or persons in one's
world is known in psychoanalytic terms as cathecting, or develop-
ing an object cathexis.7 2 An individual cathects himself to, or in-
vests herself in, objects in the external world which have served, or
which may serve, to gratify instinctive desires.7 3 Through ca-
thecting, an individual is able both to focus attention on objects
capable of providing gratification and to delay the urgency of need
satisfaction. An example may illustrate these concepts most eas-
ily. "
The human infant enters the world "human in form, beautifully
made, but animal in conduct."74 The infant possesses certain in-
stinctive drives which, when frustrated, give rise to needs. The
most notable drives are those of biological survival, sex, and ag-
gression.75 Not knowing how to or not being able to satisfy instinc-
tive drives on its own, the infant is totally dependent on its mother
for survival. Through interacting with its mother the infant comes
to know itself as separate from the external world and that the ex-
ternal world (mother) is capable of satisfying its (the infant's)
needs.
As the infant continues to interact with its mother, internal
images of her begin to develop. When pangs of hunger rise, the
need (hunger) will call forth the internal image of the object capa-
ble of satisfying the need (mother). The infant no longer will react
with a wild, undifferentiated display of frustration over not having
its need immediately met, but will be able to delay its outcry of
need (albeit only temporarily) by conjuring the internal image. 76
The image not only provides a means of receiving temporary satis-
faction in the absence of the gratifying object itself, but also chan-
nels the infant's drives toward a realistic means of satisfaction:
finding mother.7 7 The infant has bound some of the free-floating
instinctive energy into a cognitive structure: the representation of
mother. This binding of energy into a cognitive representation of
72. See generally N. CAMERON, PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT AND PSYCHOPATHOL-
OGY (1963); S. FREUD, INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS (1929).
73. See generally authorities cited note 72 supra.
74. N. CAMERON, supra note 72, at 25.
75. Id. at 130-33.
76. Id. at 44.
77. Id. at 154.
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an object capable of need satisfaction constitutes a major use of
the process of cathexis:
The term cathexis means the amount of mental energy involved. It may
be bound energy, such as we find in relation to organized fantasies,
daydreams, conflicts, object relations, the self and social roles. Or it may
be mobile energy, ready to discharge immediately, by any means avail-
able, such as we assume for the id. The concept of cathexis is useful in
describing id functions, in understanding ego adaptations and defenses, in
formulating the superego and its precursors, and in discussing object rela-
tions....
We speak of a powerful drive cathexis in infancy, against which the
relatively weak ego defenses and adaptive mechanisms cannot prevail.
We can point to the violent but poorly organized, impulsive temper tan-
trums, a familiar form of general nonadaptive tension discharge. We can
point out, within the same frame of reference, that as soon as ego organi-
zation develops which can partially contain the rush of id forces and chan-
nel them, a powerful aggressive cathexis can be discharged in a more
integrated and more realistic fashion.7 8
78. Id. See also J. COLEMAN, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERN IM (3rd ed.
1964):
INSTINCTS. In Freud's view, man is motivated by inborn instincts.
Some instincts, such as hunger, thirst, and sex, are constructive; they
are directed toward individual survival and the propagation of the
species. These life instincts are opposed by the death instincts
which are more obscure in their functioning. They are postulated as
the source of hostile aggression and self-destructive behavior...
ID, EGO, AND SUPEREGO. The instincts are contained in a subsys-
tem of the personality, the id.. The id is present at birth and knows
nothing of reality or morality. It seeks only to gratify instinctual
drives, to enjoy the pleasure that results when tension aroused by
body needs is discharged. For this reason it is gaid to operate accord-
ing to the pleasure principle. The id seeks this gratification of needs
by means of the primary process: it forms a mental image of the ob-
ject desired. The primary process is evident in dreams, wishful
thinking, and hallucinations. This attempt to satisfy the instinctual
demand by producing a mental image is called ush-fulfillment.
Since the source of instinct is in some body need, the images sup-
plied by the primary process cannot fill these physiological needs.
The body's need for water cannot be satisfied by imagining water.
Thus some part of the organism must carry out transactions with the
real world. The organism must perceive, solve problems, organize
and store knowledge, and initiate acts appropriate for achieving goals
in the external world. A second subsystem of the personality, the
ego, develops to perform these functions. Because the ego's primary
role is to deal effectively with reality, the ego is said to obey the real-
ity principle. Its reality-oriented operations constitute the secon-
dary process.
The superego is the last system of the personality to emerge. It
develops initially from the learning or introjection of the values of
society. As the individual matures, the superego is also influenced
by the individual's own critical examination of his values. The super-
ego includes what we call conscience, it is concerned with whether a
thought or act is good or bad, right or wrong.
In general, then, the personality can be viewed as a composite of
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This same process underlies much of human thought and be-
havior. An adult is generally unable to satisfy needs of aggression
directly. He or she has learned that to physically assault others
results in sanctions from both the external world (retaliation) and
the internal world (guilt cast down from the superego).79 Through
the process of neutralization (the channeling of aggressive drives
into socially acceptable methods of expression),80 however, he or
she has, perhaps, found satisfaction of this need through driving
his or her car. The car, therefore, as an object capable of need-
satisfaction, is highly cathected; a great deal of energy is bound to
the individual's internal conception of his or her car, and thus the
car gains personal meaning.
Several facets of the object-cathexis relationship are important.
First, an individual may cathect to an object and develop an inter-
nal representation of it capable of bringing temporary instinct grat-
ification, but the ability of this internal image to bring about
gratification is limited. If the desired object fails to provide gratifi-
cation (e.g., the mother does not feed the child, or the car does not
function properly), then the amount of energy cathected or bound
to the object will decrease as the individual seeks other avenues of
gratification. Second, an individual may cathect to an object asso-
ciated with the gratifying object as well as to the gratifying object
itself. Mementos and memorabilia are examples of this type of
"cathexis by association." Third, the objects or individuals to
which a person cathects vary over time. As an individual matures,
the relationships holding meaning for him or her will change in
accordance with varying developmental tasks. Reality to a five-
year-old differs tremendously from that of a twenty-year-old, and
that of a twenty-year-old differs from that of a sixty-year-old.
Fourth, more than one person can cathect to the same object in
order to obtain gratification. Movie stars, political leaders, football
teams, and the American flag are all objects capable of being ca-
thected by large numbers of people.
B. Object Loss and the Desire for Vengeance
Two events occur when an individual suffers the loss of a ca-
thected object. The first is that the individual is forced to abandon,
biological aspects, represented by the id; psychological aspects, rep-
resented by the ego; and social aspects, represented by the superego.
Man's basic nature is irrational and selfish. Only social prohibitions
(including his internalization of social rules) restrain his instinctive
strivings.
Id. at 639 (emphasis in original).
79. N. CAMERON, supra note 72, at 188-95. See also note 78 supra; note 95 infra.
80. N. CAMERON, supra note 72, at 224.
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or decathect, the internal image of the object. A dramatic example
of this is found in the process of mourning:
Now in what consists the work which mourning performs? I do not
think there is anything farfetched in the following representation of it.
The testing of reality, having shown that the loved object no longer exists,
requires forthwith that all the libido [energy] shall be withdrawn from its
attachments to this object. Against this demand a struggle of course
arises-it may be universally observed that man never willingly abandons
a libido-position, not even when a substitute is already beckoning to him.
This struggle can be so intense that a turning away from reality ensues,
the object being clung to through the medium of a hallucinatory wish-psy-
chosis. The normal outcome is that deference for reality gains the day.
Nevertheless its behest cannot at once be obeyed. The task is now carried
through bit by bit, under great expense of time and cathectic energy, while
all the time the existence of the lost object is continued in the mind. Each
single one of the memories and hopes which bound the libido to the object
is brought up and hyper-cathected, and the detachment of the libido from
it accomplished.
8 1
The second reaction to the loss of a cathected object is an up-
surge of instinctive drive toward release. By being forced to re-
store the balance between external and internal reality, the ego's
capacity to bind instinctive drives, and thereby prevent their surg-
ing into consciousness, is temporaiily weakened.82 Pain, the effect
associated with the loss, is experienced internally and gives rise to,
or 'triggers," the unconscious instinct of self-preservation (biologi-
cal survival). This need for self-preservation then presses toward
consciousness as a desire to destroy the source of the pain: the
external world.8 3 The external manifestations of this highly
charged state can be seen in restlessness, sleep disturbances, rage,
and cognitive repetition of the trauma (loss) in both consciousness
and dreams. 8 4
Faced with the situation of having to decathect the image of the
lost love-object in order to restore balance between internal and
external reality while simultaneously controlling a powerful in-
stinctive drive to destroy the source of the pain, the ego struggles
to maintain its integrity. Rage directed initially toward the entire
world is cathected (bound) as quickly as possible to become ob-
ject-specific; i.e., the rage focuses on the object perceived to be the
true cause of the pain: the offender. If the offender is known to the
victim, the victim instinctively searches for the offender, seeking to
81. S. FREUD, MOURNING AND MELANcHoLIA, para. 5 (1917), reprinted in A GEN-
ERAL SELECTION FROM E WoRK OF SIGMUND FREUD 124, 126 (J. Rickman ed.
1957).
82. 0. FENICHEL, THE PsYCHOANALYIC THEORY OF NEURosis 118 (1945).
83. See generally S. Freud, INsTruCTs AND THEm VICISSrrUDES (1915), reprinted
in A GENERAL SECTION OF THE WoRK OF SIGMUND FRUED 70-86 (J. Rickman
ed. 1957).
84. 0. FENmCHEL, supra note 82, at 120.
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actualize the self-preservation impulses by killing the offender,
thereby stopping the pain associated with the loss.85
In those cases where the offender is unknown, discharge of the
impulse occurs through physical activity (storming around aim-
lessly, pacing, yelling and screaming, etc.) and through binding
(cathecting) the impulse to alternative gratifying objects. For ex-
.ample, the victim may create a fantasized image of the offender
and then exact vengeance in fantasy.86
The desire for vengeance, therefore, can be explained psycho-
analytically as a desire to destroy that which has caused pain. The
pain stems from the loss of an object into which the individual had
invested psychic energy via the process of cathexis.
C. Mitigation of Loss, Forgiveness, and Mercy
Four factors are hypothesized as significantly related to the in-
tensity of the feelings of loss and the subsequent desire for ven-
geance which follow deprivation of a cathected object.87 The first
of these is the individual's expectation that the loss might occur. If
destruction of a love-object is foreseen, the ego will prepare itself
for the change in the external world, thereby lessening the impact
of incoming stimuli which signal the occurrence of change:
The ego may be regarded as having been developed for the purpose of
avoiding traumatic states. Its sifting and organizing [discharging and
binding] of incoming excitation are facilitated by its ability to anticipate in
fantasy what might occur, and thus to prepare for the future. Economi-
cally, such preparation consists of making ready amounts of counter-ca-
thexis for the purpose of binding the excitations to come. Events that
have not been anticipated are experienced more forcefully than those pre-
85. Whether or not the victim would actually kill the offender would depend on
several factors. If the ego has an opportunity to regain control of the im-
pulses, then the probability of actually exacting revenge or of physically de-
stroying the cause of the pain decreases. Regaining control would be
contingent on: (a) the extent to which the avenger is able to discharge en-
ergy throughout the hunt; (b) the extent to which the superego is able to
exert pressure on the ego to forsake the impulse to destroy; and (c) the abil-
ity of the ego to bind the impulse to other avenues of release such as increas-
ing discharge through vengeful fantasy activity.
86. This is not.to say that binding the rage to the offender or a fantasized image
of the offender is the only means available to the ego of dealing with such
rage; but cathecting to the offender is the most reality-based focus of the indi-
vidual's rage. Other means of defending against the ego-disintegrative effects
of a random discharge of rage exist, such as: entering into a depression to
seal off incoming overwhelming stimuli; displacing the anger onto other ob-
jects (e.g., on the spouse for leaving the door open, on the police department
for not preventing the crime, or on an inanimate object, such as a lock, for
failing to have prevented entry); rationalizing the loss through seeing the of-
fender as being in need; and denial of the loss through believing the lost ob-
ject to be merely misplaced.
87. 0. FEmcHEL, supra note 82, at 117-28.
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pared for. Therefore, an incident is likely to have a traumatic effect in
direct relationship to the unexpectedness with which it occurs.8 8
This process of preparing for an expected loss is frequently seen in
the families of terminally ill patients.
A second means through which severity of loss can be either
decreased or increased relates to the individual's experience with
loss. Those who have successfully overcome trauma in the past
are less likely to be overwhelmed by a change in reality than are
those who lack such experiences.8 9 Further, individuals who have
failed to deal successfully with loss are more likely to experience
overwhelming trauma than either those who have dealt success-
fully with loss or those who have never experienced loss.9 0
A third factor contributing to one's susceptibility to being over-
whelmed is the ego's ability to extend itself to deal with additional
stress.9 Individuals who expend great energy in maintaining the
psychic status quo are less able to adjust to a new source of stress
than are those who have inner resources available to apply to the
new task. People suffering from fatigue or physical or mental ill-
ness are more likely to experience high states of stress in response
to a traumatic loss because the ego is in a weakened state.9 2
The fourth factor which influences the degree of loss exper-
ienced is the meaningfulness which the lost object held for the in-
dividual. The longer the individual has possessed an object, and
the greater the ability of the object to fulfill the person's needs, the
more meaningful the object becomes. The more an individual has
cathected to an object, the greater the felt loss and the greater the
rage at the loss.
Mercy and forgiveness, the popularly conceived antitheses of
vengeance, are easily understood from a psychoanalytic point of
view. It will be recalled that following a loss an individual is
obliged to perform two tasks: decathect the lost object, and bind or
deflect the surging instinctive desire for vengeance in order to pre-
vent an unbridled explosion of undirected rage.93 As the individual
achieves these goals, the desire for vengeance decreases: as the
lost object is decathected, the amount of pain elicited by the loss
decreases; 94 as the pain of the loss subsides, so does the need to
eliminate the source of the loss. Eventually, time heals the
wounds of transgression.
88. Id. at 117-18.
89. Id. at 119.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 117.
92. Id.
93. See text accompanying notes 82-85 .supra.
94. See S. FREUD, supra note 81, passim.
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If an offender were caught for a crime, the effects of which were
no longer felt by the victim, the superego, by threatening a flood of
guilt, would forbid the victim from inflicting punishment on the of-
fender.95 The guilt the victim would experience for committing an
act of revenge effectively deters him or her from carrying the act
through. A victim forgives a wrongdoer, therefore, when inflicting
punishment on the offender would cause the victim to receive
more punishment in the form of guilt than would the offender in
the form of retribution. By forsaking vengeance, the victim not
only avoids guilt, but also enhances his or her self-image and ful-
fills other needs by being perceived as forgiving and merciful.
IV. DISCUSSION
The discussion thus far has presented three views of the nature
of retribution. At the individual or psychological level, it has been
seen that the desire for personal vengeance arises in response to
the loss of an object or relationship of personal meaning for the
individual. This desire to seek retribution is viewed psychoanalyt-
ically as stemming from the need of the individual to destroy that
which has caused pain: the offender. 96 At the historical level, we
have seen that retribution initially was a matter of individual right
and duty. After centuries of legislative and judicial encroachment,
however, retribution gradually was incorporated into the public
realm, and the role of the victim was lessened proportionately.
The state's usurpation of this duty from the victim has found philo-
sophical justification on the grounds that the victim's individual
acts of vengeance tend to be disproportionate to the severity of the
injury received and are, therefore, morally wrong. The state, it is
argued, is able to rationally assess the punishment merited and,
therefore, to act morally while meting out punishment.97 Finally,
at the philsophical level, retribution has been viewed as a process
through which a societal balance of some sort can be restored by
punishing the intentional offender in accordance with the severity
of the criminal act.9 8
95. At an early age a child incorporates the teachings of society by incorporating
the beliefs of his or her parents. These internalized beliefs, contained in the
superego, exist in opposition to the pleasure-for-pleasure's-sake instinctive
impulses of the id. N. CAMERON, supra note 72, at 190. That which the id
wants, the superego forbids through threatening to annihilate the ego with
guilt if it (the ego) yields to the demands of the pleasure-seeking id. The
ego's task is constantly to arbitrate the irrational demands of the instinctive
id and the likewise irrational demands of the overly strict superego. Id. at
190-94. See also note 78 supra.
96. See text accompanying notes 81-86 supra.
97. See notes 53-54 & accompanying text supra.
98. See text accomanying notes 39-51 supra.
[Vol. 60:276
VENGEANCE AND MERCY
A. The Issues
If the state seeks to justify retributory punishment on the
grounds that punishment restores a balance, two general issues
must be examined. First, punishment must, in fact, be proved ca-
pable of restoring this balance. Second, it must be shown that
punishment is necessary to restore this balance. If state-sanc-
tioned punishment does not restore balance, or if balance can be
restored through means other than punishment, then the imposi-
tion of punishment by the state is not justified (in the former in-
stance) and not necessary (in the latter instance). The relevance
of the psychological and historical perspectives of retribution is
found in their ability to provide a conceptual framework for exam-
ining both the nature of the balance sought to be restored and the
utility or necessity of inflicting punishment in order to restore that
balance.
1. Issues of Balance I- The Nature of the Balance
The initial question concerns the type of balance the state
seeks to restore in inflicting retributive punishment. Despite argu-
ments that justify punishment as a logically necessary means of
enforcing consensual rules to further the common good-for such
arguments are those of deterrence 99-punishment, at base, is in-
flicted to restore a balance between a pre-existing right and a sub-
sequent wrong. The wrong to be remedied, or balanced out, is the
unjust infliction of pain, either physical or mental, on an undeserv-
ing party. Through the return of pain in the form of retributive
punishment, the wrong is sought to be undone, the debt paid, the
ill-gotten gains relinquished, the evil annulled, the need for re-
venge satisfied, and the societal balance restored.100
Prior to the state's usurpation of the right to punish, the victim
was able to obtain satisfaction or reestablish psychological balance
individually by seeking blood revenge. Punishment of the of-
fender, in the eyes of the victim, was a means of destroying that
which brought about pain.10 ' When the state first intervened in
the relationship, the victim, it is argued, was willing to allow such
99. Ewing stated:
The retributive theory of punishment involves two main conceptions:
(1) that it is an end in itself that the guilty should suffer pain; (2) that
the primary justification of punishment is always to be found in the
fact that an offence has been committed which "deserves" the pun-
ishment, not in any future advantages to be gained by its infliction,
whether for society or for the offender as an individual
A. EwING, supra note 48, at 13.
100. See text accompanying notes 39-51 supra (discussion of the varying views of
the goals of retribution).
101. See text accompanying notes 81-86 supra.
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encroachment because the state enhanced the opportunity of the
victim to obtain revenge (i.e., restore balance). By allowing the
state to avenge personal wrongs, the victim gained two advantages.
First, the victim was able to increase the probability of the offender
being brought to justice where the offender was physically or so-
cially more powerful than the victim, or where the offender had
escaped to another region of the realm. Second, by allowing the
state to exact punishment, the victim was able to circumvent the
possibility of a vendetta evolving as the result of private acts of
vengeance. 02 The state, on the other hand, profited through seiz-
ing the offender's property and through charging the victim for the
service. The state's original interests in punishing criminals,
therefore, were to provide a means for the victim to obtain satisfac-
tion and to enhance the state's treasury.103
The notion of the victim acquiescing to the state's assumption
of the role of avenger is of central importance because the implica-
tion follows that if the state fails in its duty to inflict punishment,
the victim will not receive satisfaction and the balance will not be
restored. If the victim fails to receive satisfaction, then he or she
will seek it personally in the form of private vengeance or will
transfer to the state the rage initially created by the offender. In
other words, when the state fails to adequately punish an offender,
the victim will seek private vengeance and become angry at the
state for failing to uphold its obligation. Mob rule, lynchings, and
civil disobedience would result. Ewing has noted:
State punishment was only able to take the place of private vengeance
because it satisfied to a certain extent the desire of a man wronged that
the person who had wronged him should suffer. This desire is not a highly
laudable one, but it had to be satisfied, at least partially, if private ven-
geance was to be avoided. And, even nowadays, if the law did not usually
do its punishing work adequately, private vengeance and mob violence
would be far more common than they are.
1 0 4
From both the historical and psychoanalytic perspectives,
therefore, it is clear that the state seeks to restore a balance to the
victim by inflicting retributive punishment on an offender. By its
very nature, the psychological need for vengeance requires satis-
faction. The victim of wrongdoing will obtain satisfaction in one
form or another with or without the existence or assistance of a
102. See text accompanying notes 8-10 supra.
103. The notion of the state punishing offenders in order to satisfy private and
public desires for vengeance is one which Honderich cites as a justification
which "[f] or a number of reasons of a cultural nature ... is rarely made ex-
plicit." T. HoNDERicH, supra note 38, at 17. The closest approximations to
this argument are found in J. STEPHEN, spra note 49, and IL LOTZE, OUT-
LINES OF PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY (1885).
104. A. EWING, supra note 48, at 71. See also W. MOBERLY, THE ETHIcs OF PUNISH-
MENT 279 (1968).
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legal system of retribution. To the extent that the legal system is
unable to provide means of satisfaction for victims, they will for-
sake the law and hold it in contempt while obtaining satisfaction or
vengeance through alternative, possibly non-legal, means. 0 5
2. Issues of Balance I" Injury/Punishment Equivalence
If, as argued above, the state is under a duty to inflict retribu-
tory punishment in order to reestablish a victim's state of balance,
the issue of whether the state can effectively perform its duty
presents itself. At early law the state was clearly able to assure
victim satisfaction by providing the opportunity to inflict like-for-
like vengeance on the offender under the lex talionis.0 6 As exotic
forms of corporal and capital punishment fell from favor, however,
the state's ability to assure victim satisfaction decreased. Tedious
questions of equivalence emerged, and legisators and magistrates
faced the inordinate task of deciding how to determine the quan-
tum of punishment required to satisfy individual cries for ven-
geance across the varying categories of criminal conduct. The
solution adopted was for the state to assume responsibility for de-
termining appropriate punishment. Consequently, relying on
what Hegel termed "ideas universally present to conscious psy-
chological experience," 07 legislators constructed fixed sentencing
schemes.
The state's decision to seize control over the determination of
punishment form and severity was justified by perceiving victims
as irrational in their demands for retribution.08 Such a belief is
validated in both common experience and psychoanalytic thought.
The rage an individual experiences following a loss is per se irra-
tional in that it is wholly composed of instinctive desire pressing
toward manifestation. While it is rational to expect rage in re-
sponse to an injury, the rage itself is irrational. Only as time
passes following the injury can the ego, the seat of reason, harness
or bind the instinct and thereby bring reason to the fore.109 To al-
105. In this light it may be argued that the consideration now given to retribution
stems not from the perceived invalidity of the deterrence and rehabilitation
theories of punishment per se, but from the fact that society at large is not
instinctively satisfied by punishments meted out under the deterrence and
rehabilitation models. It can hardly be argued that such models (deterrence
and rehabilitation) are per se ineffective after only a relatively short trial (50
to 80 years). The current "return to retribution," therefore, may stem from a
societal desire to do so rather than from a careful analysis of the wisdom of
doing so.
106. See text accompanying notes 6-7 supra.
107. G. HEGEi, supra note 41, at para. 101.
108. See notes 53-54 & accompanying text supra.
109. See text accompanying notes 81-95 supra.
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low the victim to mandate the form and degree of punishment,
therefore, would be irrational, particularly if the victim were al-
lowed to make such a decision immediately after receiving the in-
jury.
Although having the state fix criminal punishments is a logical
means of overcoming the irrationality of the victim's desires, the
practice nevertheless encounters difficulties at several levels.
From a psychological perspective, fixed punishments for varying
crimes are dubious. Recall first that a basic philosophical tenet of
retributive theory is that the punishment should fit the crime or
should be the equivalent of the injury inflicted.11o Justice can be
served, Kant stated, only by punishment which exactly equals the
injury; to inflict more or less is unjust."1 ' Recall also, however, that
the magnitude of the individual's loss reaction depends on a com-
bination of four variables: the degree to which the individual had
expected the loss to occur, the individual's experience in dealing
with loss, the availability of ego resources to manage the conflict,
and the extent to which the individual had cathected (valued) the
object."12 In view of the multitude of factors contributing to the
severity of the injury suffered, to impose a standard sentence for
all acts of a similar behavioral nature assuredly results in cases of
both overpunishment and underpunishment. The victim who suf-
fers the loss of a treasured but monetarily worthless family heir-
loom probably will not receive much satisfaction in seeing the
offender fined fifty dollars for the theft. Conversely, the owner of a
five-dollar ball-point pen is likely to view a fifty dollar fine for its
theft as somewhat onerous.1 1 3
If one ignores the historical and psychoanalytic perspectives of
retribution and vengeance, then the difficulties in applying the
Kantian mandate of a strict equivalence between injury and pun-
ishment can be overcome in either of two ways. First, it can be
argued that, although Kant wrote of the necessity of a precise
equivalence, he offered no insight as to how this equivalence is to
be achieved. Consequently, his reference to precision is to a con-
ceptual equivalence rather than to a literal equivalence. In all
cases, Kant's examples of equivalence seem to stem from his own
intuition and feeling of equality and do not represent a per se
equivalence of injury and punishment.1 4 The "conceptual equiva-
110. See text accompanying notes 55-66 supra.
111. L KANT, supra note 39, at 196.
112. See text accompanying notes 87-92 supra.
113. The owner of the family heirloom is likely to make a retributive complaint
("the thief didn't get what he deserved"), while the owner of the pen may
rationalize the punishment in a deterrence mode ("Well, at least it'll teach
him a lesson").
114. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
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lence" argument, as a means of overcoming the "precise equiva-
lence" issue, is strengthened by noting that not all advocates of
retribution require the precision urged by Kant. Hegel, for exam-
ple, reasoned that equality need exist only implicitly, or in "value,"
rather than in exact equivalency." 5
The second argument involves shifting the focus of the balance
issue from the offender/victim relationship to the offender/society
relationhip. Several advocates of retribution theory (e.g., Morris,
Hegel) viewed the criminal act as creating an imbalance between
the offender and society at large." 6 In this perspective, one can
argue for fixed sentencing on the basis of community sentiments
about the degree of punishment "deserved" for various criminal
acts.
Neither history nor psychoanalytic theory would reject in toto
the notion that a criminal act creates an imbalance between more
than two individuals. Historically, wrongs committed against a
member of a clan were viewed as wrongs against the clan as a
whole." 7 Psychoanalytically, because an object can be cathected
by more than one person," 8 it is clearly possible for a crime (i.e.,
the destruction or injury of the object) to have more than one vic-
tim. It can be argued, for example, that the assassinations of Presi-
dent Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr., created a strong public
outcry because both men were highly valued (cathected) by large
numbers of people.
Shifting the focus of the retributive balance from the individual
victim to society in general does not, however, assure agreement in
the appropriateness of specific punishments for varying offenses.
Because society is composed of individuals, the same factors that
influence an individual's reaction to a loss (i.e., the expectedness
of the loss, experience in dealing with loss, availability of ego re-
sources, and the extent of the object cathexis)" 9 will operate on
the public to create different opinions as to the extent of punish-
ment merited for varying offenses. While some concordance as to
punishment distribution will probably exist, variance in opinions
will also be found. In this vein, H.L.A. Hart has noted that while a
common-sense scale of punishment gravity may exist, it
no doubt consists of very broad judgements both of the relative moral in-
equity and harmfulness of different types of offence: it draws rough dis-
tinctions like that between parking offences and homicide, or between
"4mercy killing" and murder for gain, but cannot cope with any precise as-
115. See note 64 & accompanying text supra.
116. See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
117. See text accompanying notes 6-7 supra.
118. See text accompanying notes 80-81 supra.
119. See text accompanying notes 87-92 supra.
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sessment of an individual's wickedness in committing a crime .... 120
At its essence, the general question of whether the "Precise
equivalent" issue in retribution is resolvable rises or falls on one's
willingness to accept imprecision. Imprecision in the balancing of
the injury and the punishment is inescapable whether one views
the injury as victim-specific or as an injury to the whole of society.
If precise satisfaction of either the victim or society is desired in
every case, then individuals convicted of the same criminal act will
necessarily receive differing punishments, because injuries suf-
fered by different victims in response to the same criminal act will
vary. Conversely, if equivalence in punishment is desired, then
victims will necessarily be oversatisfied in some cases and under-
satisfied in others.
B. Mercy and the Necessity of Punishment
Aside from the equivalency problems of a fixed sentencing
scheme which ignores the actual injury sustained by the victim,121
psychoanalytic theory offers a second obstacle to the effectiveness
of retribution and fixed sentencing schemes: mercy. As it will be
recalled,122 after a loss the ego moves quickly to bind internal rage
and dissipate it through socially acceptable channels. For exam-
ple, fantasizing revenge, displacing or shifting anger to alternate
objects (spouse, self, walls, etc.), and rationalizing or denying the
loss all serve as means to restore psychological balance. The issue
which retribution theory must address, therefore, is how much
punishment should be inflicted on an offender when the victim has
already adjusted to the loss and no longer seeks vengeance. Re-
turning to the example of the stolen, monetarily worthless family
heirloom, what degree of punishment is necessary to satisfy the
victim if the offender is caught six years after the offense? What if
the victim has received insurance payments in the interim? Will
such tardy punishment restore a balance, or create a new imbal-
ance?
The issue of mercy and forgiveness is one which legal philoso-
phers have consistently failed to address. Kant dismissed the is-
sue in a single paragraph by defining the pardon (the legal
analogue of mercy) as the exclusive right of the sovereign, one
which "ought not be exercised in application to the crimes of the
subjects against each other."123 Morris cautioned against granting
pardons, because they threaten "the maintenance of an equilib-
120. Hart, supra note 32, at 25.
121. See notes 111-13 & accompanying text supra.
122. See notes 81-86 & accompanying text supra.
123. I. KANT, supra note 39, at 204.
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rium of benefits and burdens."124 Morris reasoned that granting
pardons will reduce the incentive for the law-abiding to conform,
and they too will subsequently engage in crime. Gardner, in a sin-
gle footnote, posits simply that "[m] ercy, compassion, forgiveness,
and their legal analogue, pardon, are matters of grace, not of enti-
tlement. Hence, they are necessarily ad hoc and discretionary and
cannot appropriately be defined through rules."' 25
The cited arguments against a rule-defined system of forgive-
ness are flawed. Kant implicitly assumed that an injury, once cre-
ated, lasts forever. Morris clearly argued from a deterrence
viewpoint, stressing the future effects of granting pardons. Gard-
ner, by asserting that mercy is not a matter of entitlement, violated
the principal tenet of retribution: the punishment must be the
equivalent of the injury. If one is willing to assess the extent of an
injury in order to fix punishment, one should also be willing to as-
sess the possible non-existence of an injury in order to negate the
need for punishment. Retribution, under a system incorporating
principles of both vengeance and mercy, would afford the offender
the opportunity to be forgiven for his or her crime where it could
be shown that an injury no longer exists.
It may be argued that the varying statutes of limitations show
legislative intent to incorporate rule-defined elements of forgive-
ness and mercy into the law. Their purpose has been defined as
"prescribing limitations to the right of action on certain described
causes of action .... In criminal cases, however, a statute of limi-
tation is an act of grace, a surrendering by the sovereign of its right
to prosecute."' 26
While possessing intuitive appeal as manifestations of mercy,
statutes of limitations cannot withstand close scrutiny as being ac-
curately grounded in retributive theory. The victim's desire for
vengeance (be it a single victim or the whole of society) decreases
gradually with time, not in the all-or-none fashion implicit in cur-
rent forms of statutes of limitations. Under a system of retributive
124. Morris, supra note 42, at 573.
125. Gardner, Book Review, 59 NEB. L. REv. 44,52 n.32 (1980) (A. VON HIRSCH & K.
HiANRAAN, THE QUESTION OF PAROLE (1979)).
126. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1077 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). An interesting question
arises as to the role of the statute of limitations in deterrent and rehabilita-
tive theories of punishment. If mercy is granted an offender via the statute in
the belief that to punish an individual at such a remote time would not serve
notions of retributive justice, could such a rationale stand under theories
which look to the goals of setting examples and providing treatment? Could
not the argument be made that in the name of deterrence the offender should
be punished whenever apprehended? And in the name of rehabilitation
could one not justify treating the offender for far-removed crimes so long as
the offender still appears to need treatment?
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justice concerned with the integration of vengeance and mercy and
the proper asssessment of the current extent of the injury, sliding
statutes of limitations would exist to reflect the gradual decline in
the desire for revenge.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has examined vengeance, retribution, and mercy
from the historical, philosophical, and psychoanalytic points of
view. If general conclusions are to be drawn, it might be concluded
that, in Hart's terms, the retributive theory of punishment has a
valid General Aim in allowing individuals who have suffered the
loss of an object of personal meaning to satisfy their instinctive
desire for vengeance. This valid General Aim, however, will not
justify punishment in those instances where victims of crime have
adjusted to loss or have forgiven their offenders.
The traditional theory of retribution also waivers in answering
Questions of Distribution. Particularly troublesome is the prob-
lem of achieving an equivalence between the injury received and
the punishment returned. This difficulty stems from the inability
of the state to provide like-for-like forms of retribution, and from
the fact that an injury, once received, diminishes in severity (heals
itself) with time through covert psychological processes.
With respect to current arguments seeking to establish fixed
sentencing schemes on the basis of retribution theory, both the
historical and psychoanalytic concepts of retribution cast serious
doubt on the proposal's appropriateness and logical underpin-
nings. To affix a constant penalty to a specific behavior (e.g., bur-
glary, auto theft, assault, etc.) without regard to the actual injury
inflicted by the act, violates the basic principle of retribution:
equating the punishment with the injury. Standard sentences are
unsupportable in a retributive framework because: (1) the re-
sponse of victims to a crime (in terms of the injury suffered) is
inconsistent among victims, due to a variety of psychological fac-
tors influencing the individual's initial response to the loss, and (2)
the passage of time following an injury decreases a victim's desire
for vengeance as psychological processes mitigate and eventually
dissipate the effects of the loss. To impose set sentences inequita-
bly distributes punishment because cases of both overpunishment
and underpunishment will result.
While the conclusions drawn from the integration of the histori-
cal, philosophical, and psychoanalytic views of retribution are con-
ceptually sound, empirical investigations of the relationships
existing between crime, the extent and duration of victim reac-
tions, and the long-term societal perceptions of injury are needed
to assess the asserted conclusions. Among others, specific empiri-
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cal questions would include whether victims actually differ in their
subjective desires for retribution, both initially and across time,
whether society in general feels offenders should be punished less
severely as the interval between the criminal act and the time for
punishment increases, and whether a correspondence exists be-
tween the time required to pass by statutes of limitations before
the state grants mercy and the time both victims and society feel
should pass before forgiving the offender.
